An important article on Frithjof Schuon has just been published in Numen 64 (2017), pp. 258–293: This is Gregory A. Lipton, "De-Semitizing Ibn ʿArabī: Aryanism and the Schuonian Discourse of Religious Authenticity."
Lipton starts by noting the importance of Schuon for contemporary understandings of Ibn Arabi and commenting on the "posthumous Schuonian renaissance." He then goes on to make two arguments:
Firstly, he demonstrates by numerous citations from Schuon's works that Schuon subscribed to understandings of race and of the opposition between Aryan and Semite that were developed in the nineteenth century by theorists such as Ernest Renan and Joseph Arthur de Gobineau, and incidentally underpinned Nazi racial theory--I say "incidentally" because Lipton is not arguing that Schuon was a Nazi, merely that he subscribed to understandings that the Nazis also subscribed to.
Secondly, he shows that Schuon disliked what he saw as Semitic in Ibn Arabi, preferring Vedanta and Plato as Aryan. He was sometimes very critical of Ibn Arabi, for example for his “abrupt and unintelligible denominationalism.” Lipton understands Schuon's and the Maryamiyya's turn away from its originally very Islamic Sufism to a more universal understanding that de-emphasized Islam and instead emphasized the Virgin and Vedanta as a response to this problem, as "de-Semitizing."
The article is clearly written, tightly argued, and entirely convincing. There may also, however, have been other reasons for Schuon's turn away from Islam.
A Blog for the study of Traditionalism and the Traditionalists
moderated by Mark Sedgwick
32 comments:
The dissertation the article is based on is outstanding work.
Having read Schuon's 'Castes et Races', it is difficult to believe the above assertions: Schuon subscribed to the notion of a single pair of ancestors for humans. He also placed caste above race, giving himself an anti-racist veneer in the process, and placing his view at odds with that of Gobineau and co.
Three cheers to Dr. Lipton for this quite competent study -- a treatment that is both quite fair, in my opinion, and objectively speaking long overdue in the field of religious studies. I've grown irritated over the years by the lack of serious discussion of Traditionalism, and now it has finally arrived!
One reason why even Schuon fans should admit this exposition is necessary at an academic level is because there is already a backlash against Traditionalism from Muslim quarters, which has left Nasr's group a bit stuck between two worlds. This must be acknowledged and responded to, not with partisanship, but with a serious look at the facts. The section on "Ibn Arab'i and the Schuonian Imperative of Esoteric 'Objectivity'" is especially key and must be taken seriously by Perennialists even if they have a different reading of the material on race. In any case, I recommend that the anonymous commenter take a closer look at page 268, and see if Lipton has quotes "Castes and Races" correctly.
Very interesting. It is quite ironic that Schuon "departed" from Islamic orthodoxy because of his "Aryanism", while another great scholar, Claudio Mutti --who, while being different from Schuon, may be put in a close "intellectual/religious trend"-- converted to Islam because of "Aryanism" itself.
Truths, half truths, and conjecture. Much like Wasserstrom's assessing of Corbin, in his book.
I'd be curious to know, since Nasr is notedly more Islamic in his bent and he's the Sheikh now, how the Maryamiyya have been affected by this.
Thank you for sharing this fine article. In connection to his observations about race, Lipton puts his finger on something more subtle in Schuon’s writings and much of the discourse on “religion” in the West. He employs some of Russell McCutcheon’s arguments from "Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia," where religion “constitutes a private, interiorized dimension of experience that, although manifested outwardly in varying forms, is shared across all religions regardless of their historical differences.” (60) Schuon recognizes all too readily the elements of Islam, for example, that are defined by culture, history, etc., but gives the impression that his own discourse in purely objective. He couldn’t seem to admit that his own culture and history, including modern European racial theories, could have impacted his perspective. The very idea that there is such a thing named religion (or the religio perennis) outside of the particular understandings of Islam, Christianity, or Judaism, for example, is never questioned. This allows Schuon to construct his own very idiosyncratic and syncretic cult around his own whims and against the so-called exoterisms and their adherents. I believe Lipton’s work is the most important study on traditionalism since "Against the Modern World."
Very well stated points by brother Zachary. I would add that Lipton's study also provides the needed analytical framework on the level of theory which allows then the lens by which to unpack the reasons behind the "sacred nudism" and abusive cultism in which the Maryamiyyah devolved into in short order.
Thank you for your comments dear N. Wahid Azal, which I agree with wholeheartedly. To expand a bit upon Lipton's findings, Schuon's "colorless light" is profoundly white and one could even argue modern, secular European. His sophisticated articulation of the religio or sophia perennis is little more than an argument for being spiritual but not religious. We are made to believe that Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, for example, are colored by race, ethnicity, culture, temperament, climate, psychology, etc., while his vision is "colorless." See James Cutsinger's article "Colorless Light and Pure Air: The Virgin in the Thought of Frithjof Schuon." Schuon's views on religion become for him a kind of Platonic Form that he sets against Islam and the other "exoterisms" of the world. His own whims and perversions are raised to a divine status, while Ibn 'Arabi and others are dismissed for their "denominationalism." Here apparent tolerance and ecumenism are marshaled to exclude those who are too particular or attached to Islam, for example. Lipton's work is a brilliant case study on how the religious and philosophical universals of certain western scholars are anything but universal.
Greetings all,
There are several problems with this article, which I hope to enumerate as briefly as possible:
- The author displays what I will not hesitate to call a superficial understanding of Schuon's metaphysics, as evidenced, for example, by his attempt to cross logical swords with Schuon in a footnote. Given Schuon's exposition of the shahadah, as well as his concept of "relative absoluteness," one should have no difficulty inferring that Schuon would endorse the analogous concept of "relative uniqueness" vis-a-vis phenomena considered in relation to the Unique. Furthermore, it is telling that Lipton attempts to reduce Schuon's point to a mere syllogism, when one of the distinguishing characteristics of metaphysics as conceived by Schuon is that it operates beyond the strictures of the principle of non-contradiction. In other words, one often finds in a metaphysical context that the answer to a particular question is both "yes" and "no," as in this case, where all "facts of existence" can indeed be said to be relatively unique.
- The author repeatedly makes a major category error, namely his tendency to view Schuon's theory of truth as merely propositional, as evidenced most clearly by the following phrase: "...the key to 'divine Knowledge,' which is thus analogous to his 'metaphysical' doctrine of transcendent unity" (p. 267). Schuon himself has referred to the latter doctrine as "rather extrinsic" to his teaching, since doctrine, while important, is in the end merely propaedeutic with respect to "divine Knowledge."
- The author claims that "long-held European discursive strategies of racial exclusion ... substantively inform the core of Schuon's metaphysics" (p. 262). This is a remarkable statement--one that belies the all-too-academic nature of Lipton's investigation. Any sensitive and generous reader of Schuon will not fail to see that something as peripheral as his views on race really have nothing to do with the core (!) of his metaphysics, which is comprised chiefly of the distinction between the Absolute and the relative, with all this implies in increasingly inessential areas of inquiry as one moves from the "center" to the "circumference" in the task of bringing first principles to bear on various domains (e.g., race).
- Lastly, and most importantly, the author quotes Schuon selectively in a way that compromises the objectivity of his argument. The following quotations should substantiate this claim:
"Certain racial traits, which the white man tends to take for signs of inferiority, actually mark either a less mental — though not less spiritual — disposition than that of the average European or else a greater racial vitality."
Who would argue that Schuon, considered in the light of his entire corpus, valued the mental over the spiritual, or considered the former more decisive than the latter as regards man's final ends? After all, Schuon has stated plainly in an interview that one does not have to be intelligent to win salvation. Furthermore, he has made it entirely clear in his discussion of race and ethnicity that certain of the virtues one can attribute to the white race are precisely those which, when corrupted and inverted, are productive of the greatest ugliness and error. Consider the following passage, the majority of which Lipton chose to omit:
"The Hindus surpass every other human group by their extraordinary contemplativity and the metaphysical genius resulting from this; but the yellow race is in its turn far more contemplative than the Western branch of the white race, and this makes it possible, looking at things as a whole, to speak of spiritual superiority in the traditional East, whether white or yellow, also including in this superiority the Messianic and Prophetic outlook of the Semites, which runs parallel with the Aryan avatāra outlook. All these facts are now called into question because of the modern spirit, which has the power so to shake or upset all values that a natural propensity to spirituality may lose all its efficacy, and such that spirituality may in the end come to be actualized in a quarter where it could least have been expected. This leads us once again to underline the conditional nature of all hereditary superiority: if one takes account of the part played by religions and ideological influences as well as of the interplay of compensations in both space and time, if one observes, for instance, that some group held to be barbarian may be incontestably superior to some other group held to be civilized (not to mention the possibility of a personal superiority of individuals of any group whatsoever) then one must recognize that the question of racial superiority is in practice pointless."
Additionally, the author makes the following problematic claim on p. 281:
"It is thus unmistakable that 'objectivity' for Schuon is analogous to his above notion of 'esoterism' as 'the total truth as such' — both concepts accordingly fall within the special province of the Aryan, who, as was noted above, not only possesses a unique '"naturally supernatural" capacity' for 'intellection,' but also represents the most complete expression of 'the human state.'"
This is refuted directly by Schuon himself, who writes in "The Meaning of Race": "[I]f ethnic differences only too often provide illusory motives for hatred, more normally they include reasons for love: by this we mean that foreign races have something complementary in relation to ourselves without there being in principle any 'lack' in us or in them either."
Lastly, we can quote the following sentence of Schuon, which makes it clear that all of the distinctions he draws between races and ethnicities are really just matters of accent and emphasis, having nothing absolute about them whatsoever:
"All these expressions can be no more than approximations, for everything is relative, especially in an order of things as complex as race" (from "The Meaning of Race").
wa'Llahu a'lam
Ambrose
Dear Ambrose
thank you sincerely for putting things into the right place here. That new fashion of bashing Schuon with the most absurd accuses is getting really annoying lately. ( I m talking about some commentators mainly ... )
Wassalam
Nur Ali Qalandar
God forbid the late Shaykh Issa Nuruddin al-Alawi is ever properly contextualized and revealed to be something other than what his acolytes believe him to be, especially now that the files of Glasse, Koslow and Vidali are in the public domain.
http://libgen.io/book/index.php?md5=8fc1d9b0a638c7ad102feef670fac5ee
http://libgen.io/book/index.php?md5=a094d1b0d9c9aaeddc205a8dcb038169
http://libgen.io/book/index.php?md5=c4b160545375d9eb4285e247c253abda
Ambrose,
It is not too difficult for me to admit that Schuon gets some things right from time to time. There is no doubt that he loved certain aspects of Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Native American traditions, for example. He may have also loved some of the different peoples he encountered. However, at some point this love of religions and peoples became no more than so many fetishes that he appropriated to construct his authoritarian ideology. I am entirely convinced by Lipton’s research and thesis, even if it does not exhaust both the positive and negative things that can be said about Schuon. I’ll add that the traditionalist use of metaphysics can be tiresome and is often employed to obfuscate rather simple arguments. I do not buy that Schuon’s discourse is close to the mind of God. His actions, as documented in the testimonies posted by N. Wahid Azal and the research of many others, prove otherwise. Also, when you say that Schuon's theory is not propositional, it seems you are saying that it is not open to being questioned? I'm not sure what this approach has to do with philosophy, at least if we take Socrates and Plato as companions.
Zachary
I think the problem is that many of the arguments now being purported here and elsewhere seem to derive mainly from feelings of hurt caused by a perceived betrayal (real or otherwise). These arguments (and I am all for a thorough and proper critiquing btw) always seem purely emotional, rather than strictly intellectual. That Schuon may or may not have stretched the bounds of spiritual and or sexual etiquette in his personal life, should not mar his work wholesale. Btw, I myself am not an acolyte, nor do I agree with many things Schuon has written. In fact I am not even a "Believer" as such.
In earlier comments in regards to Schuon and his friends, we read "It’s not really their public corpus that concerns me, but rather their private actions that have had a negative impact on men, women and children.". We'll it certainly seems that this is not entirely true, I don't believe that one must subscribe to Schuon’s discourse as being "close to the mind of God" to see that.
Everyone of course is entirely and unequivocally entitled to their own opinion and reading of certain situations and texts. But if Schuon is dead, then what harm is it to find spiritual nourishment and gratification from his writings? It would seem that certain folks would rather no one ever touch his writings except with the utmost caution, if that. The traditionalists are treated much more like a poison, instead of possible (even if flawed) therapeutic elixir for the spiritually struggling. I've had a handful of acquaintances(who are not acolytes by any stretch) say that through the traditionalist corpus they found a way to except their being a God. Who am I to take that away from them(?), or tell them that while their quest was admirable, the grail with which The Door was pried opened for them is sullied? It just feels like some, not all, are patrolling in varying degrees as pneumatic thought police, and arguments leveled at the traditionalists seem less like claims of objectivity and more about personal prejudice or bias. Not entirely unlike the paradigm of the so-called 'New Atheists'.
Anonymous, your point is well taken and quite valid. However, there is also an inbuilt flaw to the reasoning because if we follow the implications of what you say then only hagiography becomes the legitimate discursive means and formula of speaking about any given spiritual figure. I am not sure that is what you intend to advocate, but this is where your premises lead. Given this, pneumatic policing on such issues (integrity/credibility etc) are actually an essential function of truth itself. Many traditional texts speak to it as well, and in countless traditions, not to mention pneumatic policing is purportedly a function of the celestial hierarchies.
Anonymous,
I’m not sure I would juxtapose emotion and intelligence. Researchers of multiple intelligences now recognize something called “emotional intelligence.” However, your point is well taken. If someone does something wrong, that doesn’t make true statements they may have made false. Depending on the severity of the case, I still might question their ability to function as a leader. For better or worse, when such leaders are taken as models, their actions are often replicated by their followers. Some of Schuon’s closest followers continue to replicate some of his more harmful behavior. No one is preventing anyone from reading Schuon, whose books and essays can be found with ease online. However, I do think Lipton’s critical reading of some of Schuon’s ideas warrants attention. Should we simply accept all of Schuon’s claims uncritically or perhaps ask if his universalism was and is, in some places, narrow and elitist? There are many factors to consider, but I am most concerned with how he places his constructed metanarrative over and against Islam and Muslims, Christianity and Christians, etc.
Additionally, most prominent traditionalist writers are not very open to other ideas and peoples. I have read most of their works and entertained many of their ideas, but they tend to represent and tolerate a very small spectrum of views and voices, often acting as conservative thought police and gatekeepers in academic institutions and even governments. Schuon, for example, wrote critiques against modernists and postmodernists of all stripes, traditional peoples who were not esoteric enough, and even Ibn ‘Arabi and Guénon. Nasr continues to rail against New Age and “California” Sufism, despite the fact that both his master and he committed some of the most egregious abuses of power in the name of Sufism. I think people can be forgiven if they sometimes find it difficult to dispassionately stomach this hypocrisy.
Zachary
Salaam Zachary,
I wanted to expand upon the comments of Anonymous, with whom I agree and want to thank for sharing his thoughts. But first I should say I once took what was a trying period of almost a week and read through the Glasse and Vidali documents in their entirety, in addition to much of the Koslow document, which I put down midway due to a feeling of its being permeated by a certain poison (in contrast to the other two accounts, which struck me as being more reliable in the sense that the testimonies of all involved contained therein seemed to proceed from comparatively much more understandable and relatable human sentiments). I say this because I want to be clear that I am motivated primarily by knowing the truth, and not by merely psychological excitements associated with what strikes some as a peculiarly elitist form of groupthink (and here I am only sharing an impression that is not directed towards any particular individual[s]).
Since explaining my own personal reactions to everything contained in the above-mentioned documents is obviously beyond the scope of our present discussion format, I instead just want to "skip to the end," so to speak, and make some general comments. First, I believe it is important to have a sense for the complexity of phenomenality as such. By this I mean that the play of appearances that in part comprises our conscious experience of life in the world is governed by a certain subtle genius. How do we ever discern what is true and real from what is not? How do we decide what to believe? There is often a tension between faith and the so-called "facts," and if the latter were supposed to be crystal clear and subject to perfect certainty then the former concept would be devoid of meaning. A related point is that, as Seyyed Hossein Nasr has written, "The ugly is passing accident, while the beauty is abiding substance." To be fixated and harp on what is ugly (whether in reality, one's own perception, or both) is to lend one's attention--which is precious--to what is passing, unreal, and ultimately without benefit. Of course it is true that one must be able to recognize the false and unreal in order to reject them and remove such weeds from the garden of one's inner being, but once that has been done, what sense is there in remaining preoccupied with a pile of refuse (again whether real or merely perceived)? Although you have spoken elsewhere Zachary of a felt obligation to warn others of certain evils of whose reality you are firmly convinced, is it not true that "thou dost not guide whomsoever thou lovest, but God guides whomsoever He will" (28:56)? Also: "Allah verily sendeth whom He will astray, and guideth whom he will; so let not thy soul expire in sighings for them" (35:8).
Lastly, in reference to the comment about propositional truth, I was trying to point out that Lipton seems to lack an appreciation for what "divine Knowledge" really refers to. Those who do not share this impression will of course see this as one more example of an egregiously circular and eminently frustrating perennialist logic. It is not that Schuon cannot be questioned; it is rather that the knowledge of which he speaks cannot be questioned (whether he himself is taken to "have" such knowledge or not [strictly speaking it is no one's to possess]), since in the reality of such knowledge, there is no one there to do any questioning. In "divine Knowledge" all questions, along with all beings who would ask them, are effaced by the Answer. This is the distinction I was referring to--between talking about the Truth and the Truth Itself. It is also strange that people criticize Schuon for being rigid and dogmatic, when on the contrary he repeatedly stresses the relativity of everything other than God, including his own expositions, which like all else perish in His Face.
wa'Llahu a'lam
Ambrose
Salam Ambrose,
Thank you for sharing your thoughts. I do not subscribe to Schuon’s Neo-Vedantic doctrine of maya. God says in the Quran, “And We did not create heaven and earth and what is between them for unreality...” (38:27) I think there are potentially hazardous ethical implications in believing that the world and actions are unreal or insignificant. Moreover, I maintain that kashf or “unveiling” has both individual spiritual and socio-political meaning. When the lies we tell ourselves and those we are told by others are deconstructed, we can begin to see things as they are. I try not to occupy myself with the private affairs of others, but believe it is a duty to speak truth to those in positions of power and influence. When people are abused in the name of religion or anything else, is it not courageous to help them, speak out, or at least feel bad about it?
I’m glad you’ve had a chance to read through some of the dossiers. In my view, the original Koslow document may be the most valuable because he was close to one of Schuon’s wives and near his inner circle. However, further research has shown that Koslow’s testimonies only begin to scratch the surface. Additionally, Schuon’s harmful precedents that are still being practiced behind closed doors by some of his senior followers.
My apologies to our moderator for these digressions. Returning to Lipton’s work, Schuon gives his readers the impression that his perspective is purely objective and uncolored, while almost everyone else is subjective and biased. We are led to believe that his brand of religious universalism (which I believe stems from good intentions) is somehow closer to the truth than religious exclusivity where one is bound to a single revelation (which tend to have their own visions of pluralism). Lipton helps us see that this is not necessarily the case, that Schuon’s universals privilege Aryan and European modes of discourse and religiosity, and therefore ultimately peoples. His perennial philosophy became actualized and embodied in this world through appropriating aspects of the religions and cultures he preferred and leaving a legacy devoid of or at least unconcerned with ethics.
Zachary
Salaam Zachary,
Perhaps we will begin speaking past each other if I respond in detail, but for any interested onlookers I will confine myself to two observations. One is that--as you yourself should know from having read what I assume are many of the works of Schuon--to say that he believes the world and actions are unreal tout court or insignificant is a gross misrepresentation of his thought (I say this literally and not for some sort of hyperbolic rhetorical effect). Anyone can of course confirm this for themselves by referring to his books (the gist of it being that one must distinguish between the relative reality of things on the one hand and their nullity in the Face of God on the other). The other observation (in reference to your point about "Schuon's universals) is that, in the words of Junayd, "the water takes on the color of the cup." Indeed, Schuon himself has spoken of the "human margin." Schuon's words are not the Truth, because only the Truth is the Truth.
wa'Llahu a'lam
Ambrose
Salam Ambrose,
Having read most of Schuon’s public and private writings, as well as accounts of his life in Bloomington, I believe he suffered from solipsism and theomania. While we can discuss his professed cosmology in more detail, the fact remains that for him God or the Self—as such—was really only accessible to the initiated perennialist. I believe that more mature visions of Sufi metaphysics—from Ibn ‘Arabi, for example—suggest that all of creation are so many signs or names of God. While Schuon might have written something similar in places, practically speaking he seemed to see himself as more divine than other human beings. He was certainly less interested in the rights and voices of others than his own. To me, this is not a sign of realization or even human decency.
The water and the cup metaphor is an interesting one, and perhaps gets us closer to discussing Lipton’s work. Perennialist readings of this quote seem to suggest that the various religions are so many colored cups, while water is pure esoterism as understood by Schuon. I suggest Junayd might have seen Allah, the Quran, or perhaps dhikr Allah as the water, and the colored cups as various Muslims. When the various religions are dismissed as secondary and their followers depreciated as exoterists, one is putting oneself above them as the ultimate interpreter and arbitrator of truth. Many people are searching for a universal hermeneutic to explain all things, but for me it is helpful to remember that such a vision may only work for the individual who subscribes to it, that other people exist with their own profound experiences and views, whether they are religious exclusivists or inclusivists, initiated or not, or even religious. For what it's worth, I think ethics are more important than metaphysics.
Zachary
I would not say ethics is more important than metaphysics. I would rather rephrase it by saying that without ethics grounding metaphysics, metaphysics can very swiftly descend into yet another (arrogant) Wittgensteinian language game where things begin and end in words but with usually dire consequences in the greater scheme of things in the real world. Yet ethics and metaphysics also require grounding in a consistent practice without which metaphysics and ethics both become just another futile intellectual exercise. These are things that all Sufis are supposed to understand by instinct because they are the very basic foundations of the suluk/wayfaring itself. On that note, many Schuonians would benefit from reading Ayatollah Khomeini's treatise entitled Asrar al-Salat (On the Mysteries of Prayer). One does not have to agree or disagree with the political career or historical image of the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran to know that what he offered in this piece adds quite an important dimension to the discussion which many Traditionalist and those influenced by them usually miss. Khomeini, for his part, was also a representative of the Akbarian-Sadrian tradition just as Nasr claims to be. A new, annotated English translation of this work is available from Brill.
While I agree with Ambrose's take generally, there is far more going on in Lipton's critique than simply misunderstanding Schuon, or rather, not accepting that knowledge of the real is possible.
Lipton accuses Schuon of continuing certain "racist" views of earlier "Aryan" theorists such as Gobineau. God forbid. Since Nazis.
Here's how critical theory works: Whites are racist. There are no races. Therefore, whenever a white suggests that whites have something to offer the world, like metaphysics or freight trains, it's racism. Because Nazis.
Schuon accepts that races are real and different, not, because it's some preceding terrible and awful idea, but because it is quite obvious-oh, and because Metaphysics. Also, very clearly today, biology.
It's only since the advent of dissenting and lying voices such as Marx, Boas, Freud, Gould, et al have permeated the universities (72 genders, now) that the idea that races are real has been so thoroughly maligned that one cannot notice such things in polite company. Again, Nazis.
So, especially, you followers of Islam, that are so upset by Schuon, be careful that you don't find yourself with 72 genders rather than 72 virgins. Because Nazis.
The only problem here is that Islamic scripture as well as the entire tradition of Islamic metaphysics categorically rejects, without any equivocation, the kind of warped argument that Schuon offers in Castes and Races and which you seem to be subtly apologizing for. Given this, you Schuonites need to decide once and for all whether you want to have your cake or to eat it. Yeah, because Nazis!
Look, Schuon is not for everyone, and if you can create a cogent argument from the same starting point where he goes wrong, then that's all well and good. Methinks, however that your real beef is with nudity and Red Indians, so don't confuse metaphysics with narrowness of mind.
In any case, my point isn't to bludgeon people with no interest or facility with Schuon's views, but to point out where Lipton's methodology comes from: Critical Theory.
And know this, once these folks are done with Europeans, they will turn their trusty tools to Islam and their warrior prophet that married a 9 year old. And by then, heterosexual marriage will be outlawed, along with religion, and the raising of children, and so on. You think there is a war on Islam now?
But go ahead,enjoy your 72 genders all the way to the end of the kali-yuga.
Zachary,
I find it troubling that you have repeatedly trafficked in innuendo about Nasr's practices. Many people follow Nasr and have taken great comfort in his works. If you do believe he has engaged in abuses, you should provide an explanation. If you don't feel confident in your assertions it may be wiser to keep them to yourself. But to occupy this middle ground of suggesting improprieties and creating doubts without ever substantiating them seems inappropriate.
Anonymous,
There was a time when I also took comfort in Nasr’s works. However, that changed when I came to realize that for Nasr Islam is merely a “prelude to the Perennial Philosophy,” and that he closely followed not only Schuon’s thinking but also his more scandalous behavior. I am told by those still connected to Nasr that Washington has become another Bloomington. That might be a bit of an exaggeration as to the best of my knowledge no minors were involved. With that said, Nasr has committed abuses of power, both in his capacity as shaykh and professor. If I do not say more at this time it is because the victims have chosen or have been pressured not to come forward. It was enough for me to know that Nasr and so many connected to the Maryamiyyah with knowledge of Bloomington covered-up Schuon’s crimes and presented whitewashed hagiographies with little basis in reality. I am not surprised that Nasr has become the person he most looks up to.
Zachary
Thank you for responding. I understand the need to protect victims - and the issue of balancing the rights of the accused while protecting victims is a common one. It is interesting that you say Nasr's view is that Islam is a "prelude to Perennial philosophy." This does not come across in his books or public talks. Can you elaborate?
I'm also curious about why you would follow Nasr's teachings in the first place if you found that view offensive. Nasr's appreciation of Schuon's views is public knowledge, even if he accents them differently.
Anonymous,
In May of 2016, Nasr was the chief advisor and gave the keynote address at a conference held at the George Washington University entitled “Intellectuality and Spirituality in the Islamic Tradition—A Prelude to the Perennial Philosophy.” In certain books he does offer a more open endorsement of Schuon and his interpretation of the Perennial Philosophy, but I believe he is far less transparent about this in most of his writings on Islam, such as the Study Quran.
Your last remark also deserves some comment. When I first read Nasr, Lings, and others associated with the Maryamiyyah, I assumed they held fairly “normative” perspectives on Sufism. However, part of their method and similar esoteric organizations in the West is to conceal their teachings and practices from the uninitiated. I am not against respecting and learning from those who practice various religions, so there is a part of the Perennial Philosophy that I still find interesting. However, when I came to realize that Schuon’s esoterism and ecumenism involved sacred nudity, polyamorous relationships, and inappropriate contact with children, as well as subsuming all religions under Schuon’s authority, I felt Nasr had misrepresented Schuon in his “Frithjof Schuon and the Islamic Tradition” and other writings and statements.
Zachary
Post a Comment